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ABSTRACT In this article, I explore the possibility of treating cultural destruction and the
destruction of cultural heritage as a genocidal act. My argument proceeds in two stages. I first
suggest that we ought to view cultural destruction as a necessary by-product of genocide and a
member of a set of jointly sufficient conditions for genocide. However, to securely establish that
cultural destruction and the destruction of cultural heritage ought to be viewed as genocidal
acts, we need to additionally show why loss of culture and heritage are significant harms,
comparable to other instances of genocide. In light of this, I then propose an account of the
harms of cultural destruction that grounds these harms in loss of normative agency and show
how destruction of cultural heritage contributes to this. In particular, I argue that cultural her-
itage can be viewed both as a condition for normative agency and as itself an expression of
normative agency.
A common justification for safeguarding cultural heritage in times of conflict is that
what is at stake in the destruction of cultural heritage is not mere loss of historical
artefacts but—in some sense—loss of a people themselves.1 When cultural heritage is
destroyed, severe harm has been done to those closely associated with the heritage,
and such destruction ought to be punished accordingly. This is often taken to justify
treating cultural-heritage destruction as a violation of both human rights and interna-
tional criminal law, as a crime against humanity and a war crime.2
Recent discussions have gone further, sometimes treating cultural-heritage destruc-
tion as a genocidal act—and so as a further violation of international criminal law.3
The observation that cultural destruction is closely connected to destruction of groups
is not a new one: the last fifty years have seen a proliferation of calls to treat seriously
the detrimental effects that intentional cultural destruction has on the survival of vari-
ous cultural groups. Concepts such as ‘ethnocide’ and even ‘cultural genocide’ have
become a natural part of the vocabulary of scholars, UN bodies, and advocacy groups.
However, oftentimes they are meant to designate a process closely related to, but ulti-
mately distinct from, genocide itself.4 Cultural assimilation, loss of cultural identity,
and the like are considered potentially constitutive of cultural genocide, as opposed to
genocide itself. The addition of ‘genocide’ could be interpreted as a rhetorical move
that emphasizes the severity of the harms of cultural destruction and loss.
In contrast, the recent inquiries into the relationship between cultural destruction
and genocide that are my focus here treat cultural destruction not as a separate occur-
rence, but rather as an integral part of genocide itself. Such an understanding of geno-
cide is controversial: international law is famously resistant to notions of genocide that
denote more than the biological or physical destruction of groups. Additionally, it is
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also unclear to what extent genocide and cultural destruction are conceptually coex-
tensive. What would justify such a connection and to what degree is one properly part
of the other? If cultural destruction is indeed a genocidal act, is it a necessary condi-
tion for genocide, a sufficient condition, or both? In light of these questions, my aim
in this article is to explore the conceptual space for treating cultural-heritage destruc-
tion as a genocidal act, by both interrogating the concept of genocide itself and by
inquiring into the explicit moral harms involved in cultural-heritage destruction qua
genocide. Such harms can be understood in at least two ways: as harms done to
groups themselves and as harms done to individuals, albeit as members of said groups.
My focus in this article is going to be on harms done to individuals, as members of
the targeted groups. I leave the complicated question of ways in which harm resulting
from cultural-heritage destruction can be inflicted on groups themselves and how such
harms are understood for future research.
In the first part of the article, I argue that cultural destruction indeed can be seen as
part of the concept of genocide. More precisely, I argue that it can be viewed as a nec-
essary condition in a weak sense—i.e. every genocidal destruction of a group results in
loss of culture even if that culture itself is not a target of the genocidal acts. Addition-
ally, it can be viewed as a member of a set of jointly sufficient conditions for genocide
to occur. In the second part of the article, I propose an account of the harms of cul-
tural destruction that grounds these harms in the individual loss of normative agency
and explains how the destruction of cultural heritage contributes to this.
Genocide and Cultural Destruction
There is widespread consensus that the definitive feature of genocide is its group ori-
entation. In other words, it is a crime involving an intention to destroy (in whole or in
part) an ethnic, national, racial, or religious group. However, what form such destruc-
tion may take, and, in turn, what techniques qualify as genocidal, is a matter of con-
troversy, both in academic inquiries and in legal practice.5 The question whether
cultural destruction can be seen as a genocidal act is a representative case of such an
inquiry. There is famously no explicit mention of cultural destruction in the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 (hence-
forth, Genocide Convention), the central document outlining the content of the
concept of genocide and determining its prosecution.6 As a result, cultural destruction
has never been prosecuted as a genocidal act in the international context.7
Despite this, the question whether cultural destruction can be legitimately consid-
ered as a genocidal act has been particularly pressing ever since the beginning of the
ratification procedures of the Genocide Convention.8 In what follows, I will argue that
this is the case for two reasons, which I will discuss in turn: (a) the arbitrariness of the
exclusion of cultural destruction from the Genocide Convention and (b) the overt
conceptual connections between genocide and cultural destruction.
Arbitrariness
Historically, the notion of genocide was intended to explicitly encompass cultural
destruction. The term was famously coined by Raphael Lemkin, who was one of the
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chief initiators of the Genocide Convention and one of the independent experts man-
dated by the then recently formed United Nations to produce a Secretariat draft of
the Genocide Convention.9 In his seminal Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occu-
pation, Analysis of Government, and Proposals for Redress (1944), where the term ‘geno-
cide’ itself is coined, Lemkin introduces genocide as a multidimensional crime of a
systematic nature, the purpose of which is to destroy a national, racial, or religious
group in whole or in part. Cultural destruction, according to Lemkin, is a critical
component of the implementation of genocide and consists of the destruction of both
tangible and intangible aspects of the culture of the group.10
But while it may have been the case that a cultural dimension was integral to the
initial conceptualisations of the crime of genocide, its inclusion in the Genocide Con-
vention met strong resistance from the signatory states. Some delegates worried that
cultural destruction pales in comparison to the killing of people, and due to this, there
is a principled distinction to be made between the two, and the latter should not,
therefore, be considered as part of the former.11 For instance, the Denmark delegation
at the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during the debates on the inclusion
of cultural dimension to the Genocide Convention remarked: ‘It would show a lack of
logic and of a sense of proportion to include in the same convention both mass mur-
ders in gas chambers and the closing of libraries.’12
However, political considerations may have been the most significant contributors
to the omission of the provision on cultural destruction in the Convention. As various
scholars have noted, what ended up making its way to the Genocide Convention was
largely shaped by the framers’ not wanting to open themselves up to charges of geno-
cide.13 As Luck argues, a significant issue here was decolonization, with both colonial
powers, such as the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, France, and
settler countries—United States, Sweden, Brazil, New Zealand, Australia—that have
displaced indigenous peoples, opposing the inclusion of cultural destruction as a geno-
cidal act in the Convention.14
The vote on whether to include a cultural provision in the Genocide Convention
was twenty-five countries against, sixteen for, and four abstaining. As Luck notes, the
vote was decisive, but hardly overwhelming. So many countries were absent that the
Egyptian delegation tried to have the vote postponed.15 Therefore, not only did the
negotiations over the contents of the Convention seem to be fraught with political con-
siderations, the vote did not seem to reflect an overwhelming consensus to begin with.
What this indicates is that the exclusion of an explicit cultural provision in the
Genocide Convention was to a significant extent motivated by pragmatic concerns of
signatory states, rather than deep conceptual tensions that would signify that cultural
destruction is inconsistent with other aspects of genocide. This is not to say that there
are no concerns about conceptually linking genocide and cultural destruction. I think
we should take seriously worries such as those raised by members of the Denmark del-
egation during the negotiation period—that is, that acts that are commonly associated
with genocide, such as mass killing, seem to be much worse than cultural destruction,
such as the disappearance of local customs or destruction of architectural artefacts.
Among other things, the harms of the former type, at least when it comes to our initial
assessments, appear to far outweigh the harms of the latter. Therefore, it seems wrong
to put acts such as mass killing and cultural destruction under one concept. But, as I
will argue below, this worry does not point to an inherent inconsistency in treating
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cultural destruction as a genocidal act, but rather rests on a mistaken assessment of
the value of culture and cultural heritage to individuals and the communities that they
make up.
Conceptual Connection Between Cultural Destruction and Destruction of a Social Group
Since the establishment of the Genocide Convention, the link between cultural
destruction and genocide has become much more robust, especially in scholarly work
on the concept—so much so that now it is not uncommon to note that ‘cultural geno-
cide is present as an intrinsic characteristic of every process of genocide, which can be
empirically observed’.16 This is not only an empirical observation: there is a very close
conceptual connection between cultural destruction and group destruction, captured
by genocide.
Such a connection is well established in Claudia Card’s work on the concept of
genocide and the ethical distinctness of its harms.17 According to Card, given that
genocide is a crime that targets the group and not a mere set of individuals, the analy-
sis of its harms ought to be grounded in (at least among other things) what it does to
the group itself, with individual harms being derived from this. Genocide destroys the
group by destroying what unifies individuals into one group, that is, by destroying
their social identity. Social identity is destroyed by destroying features that constitute
it—for example, shared language, cultural customs, relationships, and cultural arte-
facts. All such features facilitating a social identity make up social vitality.
According to Card, characteristic of genocide is a loss of the group’s social vitality,
which ‘exists through relationships, contemporary and intergenerational, that create
[. . .] [a cultural] identity that gives meaning to life’.18 Culture plays a pivotal role here,
since it serves as the background for social vitality by providing a set of norms that
govern it. Therefore, the destruction of culture and cultural identity is tantamount to
the destruction of social vitality. And, given that what is characteristic of genocide,
according to Card, is that it results in social death, cultural destruction is central to
the concept of genocide.19
However, not all social death is tantamount to genocide; some other factors need to
be present, and specifying them is a pressing matter. This is especially urgent given
the fact that some cultural practices and, by extension, the social vitalities that they
facilitate, can be deeply harmful. Consider a hypothetical cultural group crucial to the
social vitality of which are a variety of cultural practices involving enslavement and
other similar acts dehumanization. If cultural destruction, coupled with the intention
to destroy the group, were enough for an act to be considered genocide, then such
cases would seem to amount to genocide. This is counterintuitive. If someone
engaged in a just war with said group with the intention to root out such cultural prac-
tices, which resulted in mass death of the members of this group, all other things
being equal, we would not consider this to be morally on a par with paradigmatic
instances of genocide.20
This shows that, at the very least, social death (and through it, cultural destruction)
is not in itself a sufficient condition for genocide. Other things need to be present for
genocide to have occurred. One such criterion is that the targeted group itself not be
an evil.21 This is arguably also implicit in the Genocide Convention. According to
Card, groups are evil if (a) the group could not exist without the evil practices,22 and
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(b) the group is not capable of moral improvement and self-correction.23 Following
(a), the dissolution of the hypothetical slavers’ society mentioned above would not be
considered genocide, given that in our hypothetical example deeply vicious dehuman-
izing practices are essential to the group’s identity and social vitality. However, if the
group were able to morally improve its ways by changing its social vitality by eradicat-
ing the particular evil cultural practices in question, then, following Card’s reasoning,
destroying said group, all other things being equal, would no longer qualify as
nongenocidal.
Cultural Destruction as a Condition for Genocide
Traditionally, any of the acts mentioned in the Genocide Convention, such as killing
members of the group or causing serious mental or bodily harm, are seen as sufficient
for genocide, provided a genocidal intent can also be proven. Given the close concep-
tual connections between cultural destruction and genocide outlined above, how
should we view the status of cultural destruction in the context of genocide? As indi-
cated above, cultural destruction (or loss of social vitality) in itself is not sufficient for
genocide to occur. An alternative is to argue that while cultural destruction is not suf-
ficient by itself, it is necessary regardless. This view may be appealing to those who
are interested in establishing that not only are cultural destruction and genocide clo-
sely linked, cultural destruction is what is characteristic of genocide. This seems to be
Card’s view, which is reflected in her statement that not all social death is genocide,
but all genocide is social death.24 If this indeed can be shown to be the case, this may
then provide a conceptual foundation for prosecuting cultural destruction as a genoci-
dal act.
There are at least two ways to read the claim that cultural destruction is a necessary
condition for genocide.25 A weaker way to understand this claim would be to treat
cultural destruction as a necessary by-product of genocidal killing. Every time a cultural
group is destroyed, there necessarily is loss of culture. But if this is how we should
interpret cultural destruction being necessary for genocide, it is not clear in what sense
such loss is truly characteristic of the evils of genocide, as Card presents it.26 The
trouble is that cultural loss, understood in this sense, to one degree or another, is a
condition for any kind of killing of those who produce and participate in culture, i.e.
human beings.27 Which is just to say that it is a necessary condition for any kind of
killing. So, saying that cultural loss is characteristic of genocide does not seem to be
any more informative than saying that killing is characteristic of genocide. And given
that this is the case, it is not clear how exactly this would justify treating explicit tar-
geting of culture as a genocidal act.
An alternative way of interpreting this claim is to take it to be expressing something
quite robust: cultural destruction is a necessary precondition for genocide in the sense
that cultural destruction is part of what makes an act genocidal. If this is the case, then
establishing both that cultural destruction is a characteristic feature of genocide and
that it should be treated as a genocidal act would be an easier feat. However, establish-
ing the stronger reading is much more difficult, at least if we want to work within the
confines of the Genocide Convention. I think the uncertainty here is grounded in it
being unclear whether all of the groups that are considered to be potential targets of
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genocide—national, ethnic, racial, or religious—are meant to also necessarily be cul-
tural. National, ethnic, and religious groups seem to have an explicit cultural dimen-
sion, this way making the destruction of their social vitality a mark of genocide.
Indeed, it does seem difficult to see how one could destroy such groups qua groups
without targeting the variety of cultural practices that define them as those groups in
the first place. But it is less clear to what extent that is the case with racial groups that
are often times much broader than just particular cultural communities, and seemingly
less unified by concrete cultural practices, especially if we take the definition of race
established in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals, where
we can see first explicit applications of the Genocide Convention.
There are two ways of defining the target group of genocide that have been
employed in tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hence-
forth, ICTR), an objective and a subjective one.28 According to the objective defini-
tion of membership criteria, such criteria are to be identified by verifiable features. As
Szpak notes, in this approach the group is regarded as ‘a social fact, a stable and per-
manent reality[;] [m]embers belong to the group automatically and irreversibly on the
basis of their birth within the group’.29 Subjective criteria are criteria determined by
either the perpetrator or those who identify with the group: ‘the group exists to the
extent that its members perceive themselves as belonging to that group [. . .], or are
perceived as such by the perpetrators’.30
When it comes to racial groups, the objective criteria are tricky to pinpoint, not only
because it is not clear how should we go about establishing such criteria, but because
in trying to determine them at all, we run the risk of assuming that there is something
biological and essential to race. During ICTR, the initial cases seem to primarily have
taken the objective approach and then gradually moved to rely more explicitly on the
subjective one.31 Consider the definition of race in Prosecutor v Akayesu, where some
such objective criteria are implicit. Here race is defined as something that explicitly
transcends culture: ‘the definition of racial group is based on the hereditary physical
traits often identified with geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural,
national or religious factors’.32 Arguably, this definition is both inaccurate and quite
problematic in that, among other things, it harmfully biologizes the concept and does
not appropriately establish it as being socially constructed. Regrettably, it does seem to
mirror the variety of essentialist misconceptions about race in the general public and,
somewhat ironically, likely would be something that a perpetrator intent on destroying
a racial group would also harbour.33 This is not to say that we cannot also note some
discomfort in applying purely objective criteria in the jurisprudence of ICTR.34 Per-
haps in light of this, later cases have explicitly employed subjective criteria in establish-
ing group membership. Notably in the Bagilishema judgment, the ICTR fully
embraced subjective criteria, arguing that ‘if a victim is perceived by the perpetrator as
belonging to a protected group, the victim could be considered [. . .] as a member of
the protected group, for the purposes of genocide’.35
Given such ways of identifying racial groups qua targets of genocide, consider the
following case. Assume that the perpetrators are targeting a racial group and picking
out members of the group based on a mistaken understanding of race that sees physi-
cal characteristics such as skin colour, certain biological features, and alike, to be
essential criteria for the targeted racial group membership. They then target this racial
group based on these characteristics alone. If we follow the subjective definition of
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group membership outlined above, where the victim being perceived by the perpetra-
tor as belonging to a protected group could be enough to be considered an actual
member of such a group, this does seem to fairly uncontroversially constitute an
instance of genocide. But it is difficult to see why in this case cultural destruction
would be necessary for such an instance of genocide, given that there might be no one
overarching culture which we could attribute to a collective so diverse as a racial
group.36 Not only might cultural devastation not play an explanatory role here, it
might be harmful to insist that it does to begin with. Such a strategy would imply that
we can identify one overarching set of cultural features under which the group could
be placed, which might lead to harmful instances of essentialisation and stereotyping.
Nothing that I have said here is meant to imply that cultural destruction (qua social
death) may not be an important component of some genocidal targeting of racial
groups, but rather to suggest that it need not be a necessary condition, understood in
the stronger sense discussed above. Where exactly does this leave us? I think it is fairly
uncontroversial that cultural destruction is a necessary condition for genocide in the
weaker sense. Cultural destruction follows trivially from the destruction of its source,
i.e. the human beings who create and maintain said cultures by participating in them.
But as I have argued above, this understanding of ‘necessary’ might not be enough to
ground treating cultural destruction as a genocidal act.
In light of this, I suggest that we treat cultural destruction as a member of a set of
jointly sufficient conditions for genocide, along with conditions such as the presence
of the perpetrator’s intention to destroy a group in whole or in part, that the group
that is targeted is not itself an evil, etc.37 According to this picture, cultural destruc-
tion can be what makes an act genocidal—indeed, Card’s insightful analysis of social
death in the context of genocide provides a strong case for it doing so quite often—
but it need not do so as a matter of strict necessity. That is, destruction of groups pro-
tected by the Genocide Convention that does not explicitly target culture, all other
things being equal, ought not be considered any less genocidal. This particular treat-
ment of cultural destruction’s relationship to genocide also allows us to see in what
sense it could be treated as a genocidal act. Indeed, making it a member of a set of
jointly sufficient conditions for genocide would put cultural destruction in a similar
position as other acts that can constitute genocide, as established in the Genocide
Convention. Neither killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group, nor any other acts mentioned there are seen as indi-
vidually necessary for genocide to have happened, but they are rather treated as part
of the set of jointly sufficient conditions (where at least one other sufficient condition
is an intention to destroy a group in large or in part).
The Harms of Cultural Destruction: Normative Agency
So far, I have explored in what sense cultural destruction and genocide are conceptu-
ally intertwined. While cultural destruction might not be a necessary precondition for
genocide to occur, per se, it indeed is a necessary by-product of genocide. Additionally,
as I have argued above, it can be viewed as a sufficient condition for genocide, albeit
only jointly with others. But even so, we may still have reason to resist including cul-
tural destruction in the list of acts comprising genocide. In particular, many have
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expressed the worry that genocide ought to encompass only the worst atrocities that
can possibly be committed against individuals and the groups that they make up;
hence, the designation ought to be reserved for acts such as biological and physical
destruction.38 This is an alternative formulation of the worry of what was expressed by
the Denmark delegation presented in the negotiations of the content of the Genocide
Convention. Acts such as the extermination of people in gas chambers cannot be
equated with loss of cultural artefacts.39 In other words, cultural destruction simply is
not comparable, in its harms, to harms such as physical loss of life. One may indeed
worry that placing these in the same category is not only wrong but trivialises atrocities
such as physical extermination of people.40
There is a straightforward way to dispense with this trivialisation worry. Nothing
that has been said above fully equates cultural destruction with genocide. But the sec-
ond worry, namely that the harms of cultural destruction pale in comparison to the
harms of physical death, requires further addressing. And to address it effectively, we
need to have an account of why culture is an essential human need, the deprivation of
which amounts to a severe harm.
My investigation of the harms of cultural destruction in what follows appeals to the
loss of agency that cultural destruction brings. I do not mean to suggest that loss of
agency is the only harm that is involved in cultural destruction, in the context of geno-
cide or otherwise.41 However, I think it is, nevertheless, a central one. What is meant
by ‘agency’ here is not simply our capacity to act in one or another way. The notion
has a rich content, and it encompasses a cluster of capacities such as self-reflection
and self-legislation, qua freedom and autonomy, the ability to plan one’s life in accor-
dance to one’s set of desires, motives, inclinations, and other such cognitive and emo-
tional contents. This type of agency is sometimes identified as ‘normative’ and defined
as one’s ‘capacity to choose and to pursue our conception of a worthwhile life’.42 It is
a concept often invoked in the human rights literature, frequently by scholars seeking
to provide moral foundations for human rights.43 Normative agency is taken to be one
of the central facets characterising our humanity and, in light of this, acts that deprive
us of it constitute fundamental harms.
It is not uncommon in the literature to emphasize the necessity of culture to central
capacities making up one’s normative agency, such as autonomy. Will Kymlicka has
famously argued that culture provides necessary background conditions for autonomy.
In his justification of why culture is of central importance to liberalism, he notes that
‘freedom involves making choices amongst various options, and our societal culture
not only provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to us’.44 A similar
line is taken by Jonathan Lear in Radical Hope, a philosophical study of the cultural
destruction of the Crow Nation. Lear, following work done by anthropologists such as
Marshal Sahlins, argues that culture is necessary not only for meaningful choice, but it
is necessary for us to even imagine what such a choice might look like. This is so,
because culture frames and, through this, inevitably limits the space of our imagination
and our ability to anticipate things. Therefore, when a culture is gone, according to
Lear, the central concepts in terms of which we understand ourselves as agents, and
in terms of which our lives gain significance to us, become unavailable.45
The close connection between normative agency and culture is also reflected in the
testimonies of genocide survivors. The following excerpts are taken from interviews
that have been conducted by Louise E. Wise, as part of an investigation of the harms
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of genocide, qua social death.46 Consider the following comments from two people
from the genocide-affected region of the Nuba Mountains in Sudan, who are reflecting
on their experience of the cultural and physical destruction resulting from genocide.
Notice, in particular, the observation that is made regarding cultural oppression and
the resulting slave mentality, which can be read as a report of loss of agency and a
sense of dignity that comes with it:
Physical destruction is certainly something that is being pursued with different
intensities at different times. But I think, what is being destroyed at heart
[. . .] when you destroy someone physically, you are not just destroying the
person, you are inflicting a deeper kind of, I would call it, pain, defeat,
destruction, that is psychological and extends to the rest of society. It is
destruction of the social fabric as well—a way of living, culture. It is destruc-
tion of, if you like, the collective spirit of the group. If you are culturally
oppressed, and you grew up as a child in this environment, what outlook will
you have on yourself? You would have a slave mentality. Looking at yourself,
you are ashamed of who you are, and that, I think, is even more sinister.47
(emphasis mine).
Another person from the Nuba Mountains shares a similar experience of being lost
and deprived of meaningfulness and agency, in the face of cultural destruction:
I just feel like I’m just living. I’m just here, just feel like mechanical. I just feel
like the rest of my life is just duties and I’m just like a machine, mechanical. I
don’t feel it, the type or way of life here. I don’t feel the way that your life is,
and everywhere, I’m not attached to it psychologically, to anywhere [. . ..]
The way I feel is that life has become tasteless.48
The harrowing testimonies of the genocide survivors in the Nuba Mountains show
that cultural destruction is not only closely connected to normative agency but is also
a harm that is deep enough that some of the survivors feel like death or that living after
such destruction is worse than death itself. Consider the following reflection of the
person from the Nuba Mountains on the effects of cultural destruction:
I am from the Nuba Mountains. If they attack me, force me to change my
name [. . .] give me a name that does not belong to me. If they change my
language. If they change my ways of life. They take my land. That’s like they
take my life, my whole life. [I feel a bit] dead anyway. I feel like that. It could
be better to die.49
What testimonies such as these may suggest is that the harms of cultural destruction
do run much deeper than what may initially appear. Deep damage to (and even loss
of) normative agency that cultural destruction brings about may leave people with a
diminished sense of autonomy and meaning. It may even bring about the feeling of
losing the entire world that they had previously inhabited, insofar as our world is
defined by cultural structures and the projects that we undertake in virtue of being
influenced by them.50
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Cultural Heritage and Normative Agency
Of course, not all cultural destruction is equal. Some instances are more central to
our wellbeing than others, but this does not negate its overall centrality and the sever-
ity of the harms that are inflicted when it is lost. I think cultural heritage is a particu-
larly significant instance of culture due to the way it relates to our normative agency.
This makes loss of cultural heritage a particularly pressing instance of cultural loss.
There is little consensus both in the scholarship on cultural heritage and in more
practice-oriented work over what exactly the term amounts to. One way to define ‘cul-
tural heritage’ is simply as a list of objects that constitute it, such as valued historic
buildings, artworks, folklore, ways of life, and alike. This is an intuitively appealing
approach that allows us to avoid the problems that identifying a rigid set of conditions
for an object to count as heritage might give rise to.51 But in addition to identifying a
set of objects, there have also been calls to integrate a constructionist element to the
definition of cultural heritage. Namely, instead of only focusing on heritage as a set of
valued historical objects, we should also look at how heritage is produced, how its
meanings are negotiated and renegotiated in accordance with the cultural community’s
circumstances.52 An integral part of the concept of cultural heritage under such
accounts is its explicit present centredness: the concept refers to ways in which objects
associated with the community’s past serve as resources for its present needs.53 This
move can be observed not only in scholarly inquiries into the concept of heritage but
also in policy work. Former UN special rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Far-
ida Shaheed, defines cultural heritage as a set of resources ‘through which [people]
give meaning to their existence’.54 Under such accounts, what makes cultural heritage
what it is, in large part, is its intimate connection to meaning creation, both in the
meaning we give to the objects themselves and the meaning that they generate, given
our use of them.
Expanding on such accounts of heritage, we may argue that indeed one of the cen-
tral purposes of cultural heritage is to serve as the means for members of a given com-
munity to attribute meaning to objects and practices of their past, with the goal of
making sense of their present and their future.55 In this respect, cultural heritage plays
a pivotal role in helping us understand our present and presently perceived future bet-
ter and make sense of our roles in them. What follows from this is that one of the
things that makes cultural heritage valuable is precisely its ability to help us situate
ourselves in the world in meaningful ways.
Heritage, thus understood, is related to normative agency in at least the following
two ways. It allows us to establish and see ourselves as participants in a particular cul-
tural-historical narrative, which in turn provides us with resources of self-knowledge
necessary for normative agency. This follows quite straightforwardly from the under-
standing of heritage presented above. If cultural heritage is one of the resources we
use to understand and legitimize our present (and perceived future), broadly con-
strued, then it contributes to our sense of who we presently are and who we might
become in the future. It does so by providing resources for us to tell stories of our
place in the world and its history. In this respect, objects of cultural heritage have a
profound influence on our identities.56 Among other things, by attributing meaning to
particular objects or practices of the past, we assert (and validate) our identities as
members of the group with which said objects are associated.57
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Second, heritage can be understood as an expression of normative agency itself.
This again follows from the definition of heritage discussed above: heritage is not
about objects of the past alone. As I have noted, an important dimension of a con-
structionist account of heritage is its focus on the present. This suggests that objects
of heritage are selected to respond to the present realities of the group, such as the
need for a bonding story, legitimacy, historical continuity, and the like.58 In this
respect cultural heritage is a massively creative enterprise. Of course, heritage, as such,
seems to be a group creation first and foremost, and normative agency is something
that applies to individuals, but individuals play a central role in heritage creation by
participating in these narratives, legitimising them or rejecting them. To deprive some-
one of the resources for such creation, especially in a such violent and systematic man-
ner as genocide, can be incredibly damaging to their wellbeing and indeed is depriving
them of their normative agency, not only the conditions for it.
Conclusion
What I hope to have shown in this article is that there is indeed conceptual space for
treating cultural destruction (and the destruction of cultural heritage in particular) as a
genocidal act. I have also provided a sketch of the harms involved in its loss. As I
noted before, the normative agency approach likely cannot capture all the harms of
cultural destruction and cultural-heritage destruction. We should not expect the harms
of complex and multidimensional phenomena like genocide and cultural destruction
all to be explainable in terms of a single feature, even one as rich as their relation to
normative agency. Nonetheless, normative agency is crucial to understanding many of
these harms, and the account I provided of these harms in particular shows that the
harms of cultural destruction are very much continuous with those of other genocidal
acts.
It should also be noted that I have not said anything so far about the means of pro-
tecting cultural heritage during genocide justified by this approach. What precise
action needs to be taken to protect heritage in the context of genocide is a further
question, the answer to which depends on various other competing considerations and
obligations we might have during a genocide, some of which might indeed override
protection of heritage. A good contender to override an obligation to protect cultural
heritage might be our obligation to physically save people. Indeed, it does seem diffi-
cult to come up with cases in which saving physical lives would not take priority over
saving cultural heritage, even if we establish that loss of culture and heritage is a harm
that is comparable in its severity to physical loss of life.
This is not to say that considerations having to do with culture are not going to fig-
ure in weighing our obligations even in cases such as these. Card’s reflections on
social vitality and Wise’s interviews with the Sudanese genocide survivors provide a
strong case for the claim that our physical lives are intimately linked with culture and
its production, so much so that one may not be able to conceive of physical life with-
out it.59 Additionally, consider how widespread during numerous instances of geno-
cides the targeting and persecution of those who are often seen as primary creators of
culture – i.e. intellectuals and artists – has been.60
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied
Philosophy
Cultural Heritage, Genocide, and Normative Agency 11
All these things taken together make the question of what ought to be prioritized in
addressing atrocities such as genocide incredibly complicated and one that often
involves difficult decisions and moral compromises. My arguments here are not sup-
posed to establish that we have an obligation to protect cultural heritage over and
above everything else in the context of genocide. Rather the aim is to show that cul-
tural (and heritage) destruction may indeed play an important component part in
genocide, and, in virtue of this, the destruction of it is not something that we can
easily dismiss. How exactly the destruction of heritage in such contexts would be most
effectively addressed, and how it interacts with other competing obligations we might
have, is a different question that I suspect will depend heavily on the particularities of
concrete cases.
Relatedly, the arguments presented here are not intended to directly inform the law
regarding cultural destruction. There is oftentimes a gap between scholarly theorising
and what is adopted in the law, which is largely because what is enshrined in the law
is determined by a variety of additional (and often times more pragmatic) considera-
tions, such as enforceability and the likelihood of the specific law being adopted (espe-
cially on the international level). How such considerations bear on the legal
implications of my arguments is a further question, which is unfortunately beyond the
scope of this article.
Rasa Davidaviciut_e, Centre for Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs, University of St
Andrews, Fife, UK. rd88@st-andrews.ac.uk
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